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COURT COMPELS ARBITRATION BETWEEN ONE UNION
AND THE EMPLOYER IN A JURISDICTIONAL DISPUTE
Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp.
375 U.S. 261 (1964)
Petitioner union, the International Union of Electrical, Radio and
Machine Workers (IUE), was certified by the National Labor Relations
Board as the exclusive bargaining representative for all "production and
maintenance employees" of respondent Westinghouse. A different union,
the Federation of Westinghouse Independent Salaried Unions (Feder-
ation), had been certified as the exclusive bargaining representative for
"all salaried, technical employees" of Westinghouse. Pursuant to a col-
lective bargaining agreement with respondent, which provided for the
arbitration of all unresolved disputes involving the "interpretation, appli-
cation or claimed violation" of the agreement, the IUE filed a grievance
asserting that certain employees represented by Federation were performing
production and maintenance work. The employer, Westinghouse, refused
to arbitrate on the ground that the dispute was a representational matter
for the NLRB. IUE then petitioned the New York Supreme Court for
an order compelling arbitration. The court refused, the Appellate Division
affirmed,' as did the New York Court of Appeals, on the ground that
the matter was within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB.2
On certiorari, the United States Supreme Court reversed. 3 In an
opinion by Mr. Justice Douglas, the Court held that whether the con-
troversy was one over which of two unions should represent the employees
in question (in which case the NLRB had jurisdiction) or was one over
the assignment of work to the employees (in which case the NLRB would
have no jurisdiction unless a strike were involved), arbitration would
further the policies of the National Labor Relations Act. Justices Black
and Clark dissented on the grounds that the entire matter should be
decided by the NLRB instead of the arbiter, and that an arbitration award
between the employer and only one union might prejudice the rights of
the other union.4
The problem before the Court involved the effect to be given to an
arbitration agreement when there is possible jurisdiction over the con-
troversy by the NLRB. The case involved what the Court referred to as
a "so-called jurisdictional dispute." 5 The Court felt a suit such as this
could be one of two kinds: "(1) a controversy as to whether certain work
should be performed by workers in one bargaining unit or those in another;
I Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 7, 221 N.Y.S2d 303
(1961).
2 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 11 N.Y.2d 452, 230 N.Y.S.2d 703 (1962).
3 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261 (1964).
4 See id. at 273.
5 See id. at 263.
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or (2) a controversy as to which union should represent the employees
doing a particular work."6 The Court did not decide whether this was
a work assignment or representational dispute, but it must be kept in
mind that different considerations are necessary, depending on which type
of dispute is involved. If a work assignment dispute were involved, the
NLRB would not have jurisdiction to deal with it, assuming the facts
in the instant case. The National Labor Relations Act makes it an unfair
labor practice for a union to strike to force an employer to assign work
to a certain group of employees rather than to another.7 In such a case
the NLRB has authority to resolve the dispute,8 but prior to a strike, the
Board has no such authority. Therefore, the Court took the position that
arbitration would provide a chance to resolve the dispute and avoid the
necessity of a strike to bring the matter before the Board.
If, however, a representational dispute were involved, either the union
or the employer might petition the Board to obtain a clarification of the
union's certificate. 9 Therefore, the Court was squarely presented with the
question of whether an issue within the jurisdiction of the Board could also
be resolved through the arbitration provision of the collective bargaining
agreement. A further complication, regardless of the type dispute involved,
is introduced by the fact that an arbitration award where only IUE was
6 Ibid.
7 61 Stat. 141 (1947), as amended 29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (4) (i) (D) (Supp. V,
1959-63) :
It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents-
(4) (i) to engage in . . . a strike ... [or other coercive measures] where
- . . an object thereof is-
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to em-
ployees in a particular labor organization or in a particular trade, craft, or
class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another
trade, craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order
or certification of the Board determining the bargaining representative for
employees performing such work ....
8 61 Stat. 149 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 160(k) (1958) provides in part:
Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor
practice within the meaning of paragraph (4) (D) of section 158(b),
the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out
of which such unfair labor practice shall have arisen....
9 For proper procedure to obtain a clarification, see Locomotive Firemen &
Enginemen, 1964 CCH Lab. Cas. § 12. 895; 55 L.R.R.M. 1177 (1964). That decision
also indicates the liberal policy of the Board in entertaining clarification proceedings.
The Board states at 1178:
[T]he Board, as a major custodian of the national labor policy, should take
all positive action available to eliminate industrial strife and encourage
collective bargaining. To this end the Board has often determined the place-
ment of employees whose status is in dispute through the procedure of
clarifying and modifying unit determinations when circumstances have
changed.
See also Western Cartridge Co., 134 N.L.R.B. 67 (1961); Kennametal, Inc., 132
N.L.R.B. 194 (1961).
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a party would still leave the rights of Federation in doubt. In holding
that a remedy before the Board was not a bar to compelling arbitration
of the dispute, the Court emphasized the possibility that such arbitration
might end the dispute, and if it did not, the award would still have con-
siderable weight if the dispute later came before the Board.10 Mr. Justice
Douglas observed: "If by the time the dispute reaches the Board, arbi-
tration has already taken place, the Board shows deference to the arbitral
award, provided the procedure was a fair one and the results are not
repugnant to the Act." 11 The Court was quick to add, however, that the
Board would not be bound by the arbiter's decision and should the Board
disagree, its ruling would, of course, take precedence.12
In reaching its decision that the Board's jurisdiction was not "exclu-
sive where a representational matter was involved," the Court placed a
great deal of emphasis on Smith v. Evening News Ass'n.13 In Smith,
an employee sought damages from his employer for the alleged breach
of a collective bargaining agreement between the employer and the em-
ployee's union. The agreement did not provide for the arbitration of
grievances. The complaint stated that some employees belonging to a
different union were on strike; because of this the employer refused to
allow petitioner to report to work while nonunion employees were per-
mitted to do so. If this complaint were true, there would have been an
unfair labor practice with a remedy before the NLRB.14 However, the
Court held (with Mr. Justice Black dissenting) that this alternative
remedy before the Board did not bar the individual employee from seeking
a damage remedy in the courts. The Court in the instant case drew the
analogy that if a remedy before the Board did not bar an employee from
seeking damages in court, a remedy before the Board should not bar a
union from seeking court aid in compelling arbitration pursuant to a
collective bargaining agreement. It should be emphasized here that Smith
was not direct authority for the holding in the instant case. There was
no question of arbitration in Smith. Furthermore, the Board remedy in
Smith involved discrimination by the employer, while in the principal case
10 The court quoted extensively both in the opinion and in the footnotes from
the case of International Harvester Co., 138 N.L.R.B. 923 (1962). In that case, the
Board indicated that it would give "hospitable acceptance to the arbitral process"
in order "to promote industrial peace and stability by encouraging the practice and
procedure of collective bargaining."
11 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 3, at 270.
12 For cases overruling the arbiter's decision, see Spielberg Mfg. Co., 112
N.L.R.B. 1080 (1955); Monsanto Chem. Corp., 97 N.L.R.B. 517 (1952).
13 371 U.S. 195 (1962).
14 61 Stat. 140 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 158(a) (3) (1958) provides in part: "(a) It
shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer ... (3) by discrimination in
regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to
encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization." An unfair labor
practice charge could have been filed under § 160 of the act, s.upra note 8, but that
remedy was not pursued.
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the remedy involved the administrative procedures before the Board for
determining the proper bargaining unit in a representational dispute.
The holding in the instant case may be explained by the fact that
arbitration has become firmly established as the "kingpin of federal labor
policy." 'r A long line of cases has indicated that when the remedy of
arbitration is available, it should be used.16 Hence, even though arbi-
tration may not be final and the award may be contrary to the interests
of Federation, the Court followed this trend of favoring arbitration to
resolve disputes. 17
Several serious problems raised by the instant case are left unan-
swered. One of the major questions raised is what effect the decision will
have upon the Board's position of assuming jurisdiction over such a dispute
when arbitration is being sought or is in process. In this case, Westing-
house apparently protested arbitration because it did not want to be sub-
jected to redundant proceedings before the arbiter and the Board' s or to
the risk of inconsistent awards under the two collective bargaining agree-
ments. The Court replied that "the superior authority of the Board may
be invoked at any time."'19 This seems to imply that the employer may
still have the issue resolved with finality by the Board. However, this
will depend on the position taken by the Board when the employer seeks
to invoke its jurisdiction. Will the Board follow some of its previous
decisions and refuse to exercise jurisdiction when the aggrieved party
has not exhausted his arbitration remedy ?20 The Board should not follow
this so-called "abstention doctrine" 21 in a case such as the instant one,
15 Pfister, "Arbitration and the Supreme Court 1962 Spring Term," 4 Ariz.
L. Rev. 200, 202 (1963).
16 See, e.g., Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Local 50, Bakery Workers, 370 U.S. 254
(1962); Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962); United Steel-
workers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593 (1960) ; United Steelwork-
ers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960); United Steelworkers v.
American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960).
17 For two excellent articles discussing this trend toward a favorable arbi-
tration policy see, Pfister, "Arbitration and the Supreme Court 1962 Spring Term,"
supra note 15; Weiss, "Labor Arbitration and the 1961-1962 Supreme Court," 51
Geo. L. J. 284, 286 (1963).
18 Of course, under the facts of the principal case the problem of duplicative
proceedings would be a real threat only if a dispute under § 9(c) (1) of the National
Labor Relations Act, 61 Stat. 144 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 159(c) (1) (1958), were
involved. If this were solely a work assignment dispute, absent a strike, there would
not be a duplicative proceeding before the Board. If a true representational matter
were involved, then a proceeding before the Board would be possible under § 9(c) (1)
even though the issue had been submitted to arbitration.
19 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 3, at 272.
20 See Pacific Tile & Porcelain Co., 137 N.L.R.B. 1358 (1962); United Tel.
Co., 112 N.L.R.B. 779 (1955); McDonnell Aircraft Corp., 109 N.L.R.B. 930 (1954).
21 For an excellent discussion of this "abstention doctrine" and illustrative cases,
see Wollett, "The Interpretation of Collective Bargaining Agreements: Who Should
Have Primary Jurisdiction?," 10 Lab. L. J. 477 (1959).
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especially since the Court has indicated that the Board's authority may be
invoked at any time. Cases in which the Board has refused to take juris-
diction were those involving matters of contract interpretation where
interpretation of the contract would resolve the unfair labor practice issue
that was within the Board's jurisdiction or would avoid the necessity
of facing such an issue.22 Upon the facts presented by the instant case,
where an arbitration proceeding will be binding on only two of three
interested parties, it would be in the best interest of all concerned for
the Board to assume jurisdiction when asked to do so and to render a
final and binding decision upon all three parties. This, of course, assumes
that a representational matter is involved and that the Board has juris-
diction to settle the issue by a clarification proceeding. If a work assign-
ment dispute were involved, there would be no problem of whether the
Board should assume jurisdiction, since absent a strike or other coercion
it cannot do so. In such a case, the problem of inconsistent awards would
be even more vexatious to Westinghouse because it could not invoke
the Board's jurisdiction.
A corollary question presented here would be whether the effectiveness
of the employer's remedy before the Board will depend upon the timeliness
of invoking the Board's jurisdiction. In this case, Westinghouse had
notice of the dispute, was asked to arbitrate, refused to do so, and was
finally compelled to arbitrate by the Court. May Westinghouse now
bring its case before the Board, more than two years after it was first
informed of the dispute? Laches on the part of Westinghouse may per-
suade the Board to defer jurisdiction and to allow the dispute to go to
arbitration. It appears that the safest policy for the employer to follow
would be to petition the Board for a clarification of the certificate im-
mediately upon being informed of the dispute or upon being asked to
arbitrate.
Assuming there is no resort to the Board and that arbitration is com-
pelled, a second major problem, raised by Mr. Justice Black in his dissent,
is how to protect the rights of the employees belonging to Federation,
the other union. Mr. Justice Black suggests that the rights of the employees
of Federation would "be sacrificed by an arbitration award in proceedings
between IUE and Westinghouse," and this would be "offensive to due proc-
ess concepts. '23 Such an award would not be binding upon Federation, but
"the weight of the arbitration award is likely to be considerable, if the
Board is later required to rule on phases of the same dispute."24 In other
words, if the result were unfavorable to Federation and Federation were
to take its dispute before the Board (assuming a representational dispute),
weight might be given to an arbitration award to which Federation was
not a party. The rights of Federation would also be in jeopardy if a
work assignment dispute were involved where Federation could not have
the issue resolved by the Board, and would either have to accept the
22 Id. at 478, 482.
23 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 3, at 274.
24 Id. at 271. (Emphasis added.)
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award, begin another arbitration proceeding under its collective bargaining
agreement, or call a strike in order to bring the problem before the Board.
Perhaps what the Court was doing here was adopting a hands-off
policy since there was a possibility that the award would be favorable
to Federation and that therefore Federation's rights would not be preju-
diced. As the Court states, "arbitration may as a practical matter end
the controversy."'25 Mr. Justice Harlan in his concurring opinion seems
to indicate the Court's policy when he suggests that the choice is one
between no arbitration at all and "one which at worst will expose those
concerned to the hazard of duplicative proceedings." 26 The Court has
previously followed a similar course, as is indicated by Whitehouse v.
Illinois Central R.R. 7 In that case, a jurisdictional dispute arose, and
the National Railroad Adjustment Board assumed jurisdiction over the
employer and one of two unions. The employer, not wanting to resolve
the dispute with only one union, sued in the courts for relief. The Supreme
Court adopted a hands-off policy, saying that "Railroad's resort to the
courts has preceded any award, and one may be rendered which could
cause no possible injury to it.' '28
A possible solution to protect Federation would be to allow it to
intervene in the arbitration proceeding between IUE and Westinghouse.
In such a situation, Federation would be able to present its case and to
attempt to secure a favorable award, the weight of which "is likely to be
considerable if the Board is later required to rule' 29 on the dispute. Also,
with all three interested parties in the arbitration proceeding, the chances
are better that the arbitration would be of the "final and binding type"
which the Court believes furthers the objectives of the Labor Management
Relations Act. The problem is whether or not such intervention by Fed-
eration would be allowed. It would seem that the logical extension of the
instant case should permit such intervention. The Court assumes by
implication that some type of intervention is appropriate when it declares
that "unless the other union intervenes, an adjudication of the arbiter
might not put an end to the dispute." 30 It is not clear whether this state-
ment by the Court is authority for the proposition that intervention by
the second union is permissible in the arbitration proceeding or merely
authority that the union can intervene in the court proceeding. If the
statement refers to intervention in the court proceeding the court should
be able to compel tripartite arbitration in order to make the following
arbitration effective.2 ' If Federation is permitted to intervene, additional
25 Id. at 265.
26 Id. at 273.
27 349 U.S. 366.
28 Id. at 373.
29 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 3, at 271.
30 Id. at 265.
3' Local No. 1505 Int. Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Local Lodge No. 1836, 304
F.2d 365 (1st Cir. 1962). In this case, the court indicated that intervention by the
second union would be permissible. There were also involved here two unions and
one employer. One union was seeking to compel the employer to arbitrate and the
1964]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
problems will arise; e.g., since Federation is allowed to intervene, will it
be compelled to do so? If it chooses not to intervene after being invited
to or notified of the arbitration hearing, will it be bound by the award upon
some theory of waiver or estoppel? Such questions concerning intervention
are novel ones, and will have to be resolved by future litigation or statutes.
It is unfortunate that the Court did not specifically decide whether
this controversy was a work assignment dispute or a representational
matter. If this were a work assignment dispute and only one union were
involved, the decision would unquestionably be correct, since, absent a
strike, no remedy is available before the Board. Arbitration would fill
the gap and further the congressional policy of peaceful and rapid settling
of labor disputes. However, since the Court says arbitration would also
further labor law policy if a representational dispute were involved, the
decision presents the problems outlined above. If the jurisdiction of the
Board cannot be invoked at any time or if the rights of Federation cannot
be protected, compelling an employer to arbitrate with only one of the
two contesting unions would, as Mr. Justice Black stated, require that
"the National Labor Relations Board, the agency created by Congress
finally to settle labor disputes in the interest of industrial peace, . . . be
supplanted in part by so-called arbitration which in its very nature cannot
achieve a final adjustment of those disputes." 32
second union intervened in the suit, requesting that it be allowed to participate
in the proposed arbitration. Although the case was disposed of on other grounds,
the court stated that bilateral arbitration rather than tripartite arbitration would
not make "arbitration the true instrument of industrial peace."
32 Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., supra note 3, at 275.
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